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Abstract 
Economic analyses of emission permit trading have mainly looked into the cost effectiveness 
and cost saving potential of international permit trading compared to a pure national trading 
system. Little attention has been drawn to the environmental effectiveness of international 
trade in greenhouse gas emission permits. Less environmental ambitiousness caused by 
relatively low emission reduction targets in some countries might lower the permit price on 
the international market, but might also reduce environmental effectiveness. 
 
This paper considers the question under what conditions domestic markets of emission 
permits would and should merge to become an international market when environmental 
integrity has to be preserved and how environmental and cost effectiveness could be 
combined. In a two-country model three different policy instruments of the importing country 
are examined, namely a price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount and 
import quota). All instruments restrict trade. The importing country (and regulator) prefers an 
import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting country releases 
additional permits, the importing country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as 
that would be ineffective if not counterproductive. Instead, the importing country should aim 
to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting country that are 
independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the 
importing country. An import quota would also stress the idea of supplementary of the 
flexible mechanism as it increases the share of emissions reduced domestically. Compliance 
and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the importing and the 
exporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as 
sellers’ liability would less constrain the market. 
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1. Introduction 
The current international climate policy regime, defined by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol (KP), is based on legally 
binding emission reduction targets and international flexibility mechanisms, including trade in 
emission permits. However, progress in international negotiations is slow, and failure is not 
excluded. Some countries may be impatient, and regulate carbon dioxide emissions with a 
domestic market for emission permits. Denmark and the UK indeed have done so already. Or, 
if the international negotiations collapse, some countries may want to reduce emissions 
unilaterally, but reap the benefits of international flexibility mechanisms nonetheless. This 
paper investigates the question whether international trade in emission permits is possible 
without a multilateral treaty on emission reduction targets or even a multilateral treaty on 
regulating international trade. The answer to both questions is affirmative, contrary to the 
apparent belief of at least some of the negotiators on and analysts of climate policy. Although 
this paper is phrased in terms of climate change, its results hold for other transboundary 
externalities as well. 
 
In this paper, there is trade between countries with different beliefs about the seriousness of 
climate change. We analyze the possibilities of regulating the international market with price 
and quantity instruments in a stylized two-country model. We find that it is in both countries 
interests to form an international market and it may even be beneficial to the environment. 
Our two-country model can easily be generalized to many countries, and our approach might 
also be useful to investigate emissions trade between the U.S. and countries that ratified the 
KP, between the developing countries and the Annex B countries, and even between Annex B 
countries in a future commitment period. The policy instruments discussed in this paper might 




There is little, if any, literature on this subject. The original literature on tradable permits is all 
framed in a domestic context. The literature on internationally traded permits almost 
unanimously assumes that there is an international agreement on at least the permit allocation. 
Boom (2001), an exception, examines the effects on abatement commitments, total emissions 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Babiker et al. (2002). Andresen et al. (2002) investigate Norway as an early test case for the feasibility 
of ambitious climate agreements. 
  2and welfare of international emissions trading. Bohm (1992) and Helm (2000) also investigate 
the (re)distribution effects of trade, and thus implicitly the desire of countries to adopt 
different emission reduction targets with trade than without. However, these papers do not 
consider domestic or institutional regulation of the international market.  Bradford (2001) 
proposes a “no-cap but trade” system in which countries voluntarily contribute money to a 
global organization, which subsequently purchases emission reduction where that is cheapest. 
We share Bradford’s lack of an international agreement on targets, and international cost-
effectiveness, but our mechanism is quite different. 
 
Section 2 starts with a stylized model of two domestic emissions markets. Section 3 extends 
the model to include regulation by the importing country. Section 4 investigates whether the 
importing country can prevent the exporting country from issuing additional permits. Section 
5 expands the analysis to liability issues, and examines the consequences for a bi-national 
market in emission permits. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The case of two domestic emissions markets 
Let us consider two countries, each committed to reducing their emissions of greenhouse 
gases.
2 Let us assume that the costs of emission abatement in one country are independent of 
emission reduction costs in the other country.
3 Let us first consider a simple model: 
(1)   
22 min  s.t.  ;min  s.t. 
AB
AA A A A BB B B RR CR R TCR R    B T
B T  
                                                
A and B denote the two countries. C denotes emission reduction costs, R emission reduction, 
and T the emission reduction target.  is a parameter. The solution to (1) is that RA=TA and 
RB=TB. The marginal costs are 2αATA and 2αBTB, respectively.  
 
Now let us introduce trade in emission permits. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
Country A imports permits from Country B, that is αA>αB: 
(2)   
2 2 min +  s.t.  ;min -  s.t. 
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR P R P TCR P R P     





2 For simplicity,  we discuss the case of only one greenhouse gas in the following sections, but the analysis could 
be easily extended to more. 
3 See Kemfert et al. (2001) for alternative assumptions. 
  3The first order conditions of (2) are: 
(3a)    20   AA A R
(3b)    0 A  
(3c)    0 AA RP T  
(3d)    2 0 BB B R  
(3e)    0 B   
(3f)    0 BB RP T  











































Without trade, the marginal costs of emission reduction are different for both countries. In (1) 
the marginal costs or the shadow values of the constraint (from here onwards: shadow price
4) 
are 2αATA and 2αBTB, respectively. With trade, the marginal costs or the shadow prices are the 
same for both countries and are equal to the permit price.
5 See Table I.  
 
As expected, both countries gain from trade. For the buying country the costs of emission 
reduction become smaller and the selling country gets revenue for the exported permits. 
Therefore, in the buying country the shadow price of emissions reduction goes down, as 
imported permits expand its options to meet the target. For the selling country, the shadow 
price goes up, as they reduce emissions in addition to their domestic target for export. This is 
not immediately obvious from (4). However, the shadow prices without and with trade are 
only equal at the point at which trade goes to zero: 
                                                 
4 The costs of slightly changing the emissions target; the λs in (3) and (4). 
5 This is independent of the specific shape of the emission reduction cost functions. However, the ratio would 
change if there were transaction costs in international permit trade.  






















                                                
 
In words, the shadow price of Country B is higher with than without trade up to the point that 
Country B stops exporting (P=0) and starts importing. 
Obviously, the less similar the countries’ targets and costs, the more room there is for trade, 
and the greater are the differences between shadow prices with and without trade. With trade, 
for both countries,  a lower target in the other country implies lower costs for both countries, 
as it decreases the permit price and increases the amount of traded permits. 
 
3. Domestic regulation of a bi-national market 
The introduction of international trade in emission permits may induce the buying country to 
decrease the number of its emission permits. Because the costs of emission reduction are 
smaller, the buying country can afford a stricter target. (The reverse may happen in the selling 
country.) Trade raises its shadow price, and releasing additional permits would lower the 
shadow price to its marginal benefits of reduced climate change. There is no solution to this. 
If the selling country adopts a less stringent target, it also lowers the shadow price in the 
buying country. And, if the buying country adopts a more stringent target, it also raises the 
shadow prices in the selling country. In fact, the ratio of the shadow prices is always 1:1.
6  
 
If the selling country increases the number of its emission permits, this is beneficial to their 
industry, but is at the expense of the environment. If the buying country reduces the number 
of its emission permits, this is beneficial to the environment, but is at the expense of their 
industry. If we assume the buying country to be a relatively environmental friendly country, 
an increase in the number of the emission permits in the selling country would not be received 
well in the buying country.  
 
3.1 Quantity instruments: Carbon discount and import quota 
Suppose the buying country decides to discount emission reduction in the selling country by a 




6 If the ratio of the marginal benefits of emission reduction also equals 1:1, then no trade would occur (provided 
that the cost functions are quadratic). 
  5With a carbon discount, the problem looks like: 
(6)   
22 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.        
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR P R d P TCR P R P   B T
B T  
                                                
with 0≤  d ≤ 1.
7 For given emission reduction targets, total emissions fall by (1-d)P. The 
shadow prices of both countries are given in Table I, as is their ratio. 
 
Introducing d reduces the shadow price in the selling country, but raises the shadow price in 
the buying country. In fact, the shadow prices lie somewhere in between what they would 
have been without trade and with undistorted trade. The ratio of shadow prices changes to 1/d, 
so that this ratio can in principle also reflect the ratio of the marginal benefits
8 of emission 
reduction. Introducing or lowering d increases the total costs of the selling country compared 
to a situation of free trade, so that the buying country can use this as a threat to the selling 
country not to flood the market with permits – provided, of course that A is willing to pay the 
price; see below for further discussion. 
 
A carbon discount is not the only quantity instrument. Country A could also limit the amount 
of imported permits. For example, Country A has to achieve at least 50% of its total emission 
reduction domestically. A proposal with the same intention was adopted in May 1999 by the 
European Union Council of Ministers (8346/99) as a strategy to limit on the amount of traded 
permits with respect to the KP flexibility mechanisms and to stress the supplementary 
requirements.
9 With such an import quota the problem looks as follows: 
(7)    
2 2 min +  s.t.   and  ;min  s.t. 
A B
AA A A A A BB B B R R CR P R P TR P CR P R P         
with  > 0.
10 Unlike the carbon discount d, total emissions are not affected by the import 
quota . The shadow prices of both countries are given in Table I, as is their ratio. 
 
Introducing an import quota  has the same effects on the costs as a carbon discount has. 
Compared to a situation of free trade it reduces the shadow price in the selling country and 
raises it in the buying country. If Country A restricts the amount of imported permits, imports 
would stay constant. For Country B, an import restriction would increase its costs. For 
Country A, an import quota would decrease the costs, because the quota reduces the permit 
price and more so if B’s target is weak. This is not generally true – it depends on both 
 
7 The first-order conditions and the solution are given in the appendix. 
8 That is, the benefits of reduced climate change. 
9 See Baron et al. (1999), Woerdman (2001) and Westskog (forthcoming). 
10 The first-order conditions and the solution are given in the appendix. 
  6countries emission reduction targets together with the extent of A’s import restrictions. If 
trade is not affected by the constraint, that is A reduces more than required domestically, we 
have a free trade situation.  
 
3.2 Price instrument: Tariff 
Besides a quantity instrument, the buying country can also introduce a price instrument, like a 
tariff. A major difference with the quantity instruments is that Country A gains revenue by 
setting a tariff. We assume that the revenue is redistributed to the population without affecting 
the domestic market for emissions permits. With a tariff, the problem looks as follows:
11 
(8)   
22 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.       
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR t P R P TCR P R P   B T
                                                
with t ≥ 1. Total emissions are not affected by a tariff. The shadow prices of both countries 
are given in Table I, as is their ratio, which equals t/1. Introducing a tariff therefore also 
allows that the ratio of shadow prices equals the ratio of marginal benefits. 
 
In general, the tariff drives a price wedge between the two national markets. It lowers the 
price for emission permits in the exporting country and raises it in the importing country but 
by less than the tariff rate. Country B sells less permits to A, and at a lower price. However, 
as with the quantity instruments, the shadow price of B falls and its total costs rise. Therefore, 
the threat of a tariff can also be used to deter B from flooding the market with permits. 
 
3.3 Comparison of the different instruments 
In this section, we use two numerical simulations to compare total and marginal costs for both 
countries to illustrate the differences and equalities of the different instruments with respect to 
costs. The relationship between discount and tariff (with t=1/d) to the quota follows from 
(A6). See also Table I where the ratios of the shadow prices are calculated. 
 
Figure 1 displays total costs for both countries as a function of the discount, the tariff  and the 
import quota. The costs of both countries always stay below the “no trade” case (with equal 
targets) regardless of whether trade is regulated or free, and whether discount, quota or tariff 
is used for regulation. With a higher tariff or quota or a lower discount, Country A always 
increases the amount of permits reduced domestically and lowers the amount of imported 
permits. That increases costs, if the permit price is unaffected. Country A loses out from both 
a tariff and a discount, but a tariff is always less expensive than a discount because of the 
 
11 The first-order conditions and the solution are given in the appendix. 
  7revenue of the tariff. Country A’s costs increase for tariffs, discounts and larger quotas, but 
always stay below the no trade scenario. However, Country A gains from a small import 
restriction, but if Country A sets  high and lowers the amount of imported permits 
significantly compared to a free trade situation they would increase their costs, just as a tariff 
or discount would do. In setting import restrictions there is a trade-off between lowering the 
permit price and stifling imports. 
 
A tariff is always more expensive to Country B than a discount. A tariff reaps some of B’s 
producer surplus and transfers it to A. An import quota is always the most expensive 
instrument to Country B. The reason is, that the quota lowers the permit price more than a 
discount and a tariff, and at the same time it lowers the amount of traded permits also more 
than both discount or tariff. 
 
The effects shown in Figure 1 are even more pronounced for both countries if B’s target is 
weaker or its emission reduction costs lower. However, Country B can gain from a discount
12 
if its emission reduction target is low or negative.
13 A discount leads to an increase in total 
emission reduction even though the emission reduction targets are unchanged. In cases where 
Country B has a low target, a small discount (d close to 1) increases the amount of traded 
permits as well as the permit price relative to a free trade situation (d=1). From B’s 













                                                 
12 See the lower left side of Figure 1. 
13 Low target stands here for a situation where Country B would have no costs but net benefits with free trade, 
that is trading hot air.  
  8 
igure 1. The total costs of Country A (left axis) and Country B (right axis) as a function of 
igure 2 shows the shadow prices of both countries as a function of the discount, the tariff  
eter 









































































the discount, tariff and quota. The point on the far left corresponds to the situation of free 
trade, the far right point to the situation of no trade. The target of Country A is 200; B’s target 
is 50; αA=2; αB=1. 
1The equation for the relation between quota and discount or tariff follows 





and the import quota. The figure confirms that trade increases the shadow price of emission 
control in Country B, and decreases the shadow price in Country A. Restrictions on trade 
make this less pronounced; indeed, if the discount, tariff or quota is set so high that trade 
ceases, the shadow prices of both countries return to their no trade levels.
14 A tariff and a 
quota make B’s shadow price fall faster than does a discount; this is independent of param
choice. A discount makes A’s shadow price rise faster than does a tariff or quota; again, this 
is independent of the parameters. These effects are slightly more pronounced if B’s target is 





14 This can be seen by solving P=0 for d and t in Equations (A3a) and (A9a), respectively, and substituting the 
results in Equations (A3b-c) and (A9b-c), respectively. For , this can be directly seen from (A6a).  
 Figure 2. The shadow prices of Country A (left axis) and Country B (right axis) as a function 
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of free trade, and the far right to the situation of no trade. The target of Country A is 200; B’s 
. Environmental integrity 
ne of the reasons why Country A would regulate trade is to prevent Country B from issuing 




                                                
target is 50; αA=2; αB=1.
 1The equation for the relation between quota and discount or tariff 






more and more permits and pe
far, we avoided the question whether Country A is able to do so. We did show that a discount,
would lead to a loss to Country B if it has a relatively strict target.
15 On the other hand, 
Country B would gain if it sets a lower target. The trade-off between the two effects is shown 
in Figure 3. We assume that if Country B lowers its target, Country A increases the disco
so that total emissions stay constant
16, preserving “environmental integrity”. The benefits of a 
lower target would be greater than the costs of a higher discount. Only if Country B lowers its
target substantially, could Country A deter Country B from issuing additional permits. 
 
15 If Country B has a loose target, it would gain if Country A installs a discount – in that case, a discount would 
only encourage Country B to loosen its target further. 
16 The equation for this follows straightforwardly from (A3). 
  10Figure 3. The total costs of Country B for three cases. In the first case (“lower target”), the 
discount is kept constant (at 0.95 when B reduces the target first from 90 to 85) and B’s target 
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B lower target both
0
0.50) and B’s target are varied and exactly offset each other with regard to total emissions 
ion 
duction targets. With a tariff or a quota, total emissions are unaffected. These instruments 
nd 
y of the instrument of Country A is chosen such that the amount of imported 
ermits exactly offsets B’s lower target.
18 For Country A, costs differ substantially between 
d 
                                                
(RA+RB=290). The target of Country A is 200; αA=2; αB=1. 
 
Country A can influence total emissions with a discount as it drives a wedge between total 
emissions and total emission reduction targets. Total emission stay always below the emiss
re
are therefore not suited to preserve “environmental integrity” at first sight, but they might 
support A’s effort to prevent country B from choosing a too low emission reduction target. 
Country A might use those instruments as an deterrent. Therefore, we turn our attention to 




Figure 4 shows the trade-off between the two effects. The target of Country B is varied, a
the intensit
p
the three instruments. A discount is more expensive than a tariff, and a tariff is more 
expensive than a quota. Using a discount would increase the amount of emissions reduce
internationally significantly, but at A’s expense. 
 
17 The equation for this follows from (A3), (A6) and (A9). 
18 However, if we would have chosen in our numerical example a lower target for Country B, it would have been 
sufficient for Country A to hold the amount of imported permits constant. 
  11The amount of traded permits is equal for a discount, a tariff and a quota (by construc
and the permit price is equal as well. So, for Country B, the total costs are the same, 
regardless of the instrument. As can be seen from
tion), 
 Figure 4, the combination of a lower target 
 
and a more stringently regulated market increases the costs of Country B. 
 
So, if Country A aims at the import of permits, it can deter Country B from flooding the 




Figure 4. Total costs of Country B for three cases. In the first case (“lower target”), tariff, 
discount and quota are kept constant and B’s target is varied (from 90 to 40). In the second 
case (“both”), both the tariff, the discount respectively  the quota (tariff from 1 to 3.15, 




































each other with regard to the amount of traded permits. P decreases from 103 to 53 permits







  125. Compliance and liability 
o far, we have assumed that all participants in emission permit trading comply with their 
gulations. However, the implementation of a strong compliance system is a crucial aspect of 
gulation.  
e between countries under international 
gulation.
19 A range of liability rules addressing the risk of overselling have been proposed 
 are held 
mpliance, for instance because 
 has sold too much, that is the problem of that firm, and not a problem of the firms it has 
 
 the firm in Country B is out of 




                                                
S
re
any effective environmental re
 
The literature on compliance and liability for greenhouse gas emission permits is placed in the 
context of the Kyoto Protocol, that is, trad
re
all intending to limit the traded permits to quantities in surplus to sellers’ compliance needs.
20 
These rules can be divided into three groups: (1) the seller, (2) the buyer or (3) both
liable for non-compliance by the seller. Unfortunately, no first best rule can be determined. 
Furthermore, all are likely to have a significant impact on the market. In this section, we 
discuss the two main principles, sellers’ and buyers’ liability. 
 
Domestically, each firm would have to demonstrate to the regulator that its actual emissions 
do not exceed its total amount of permits. If a firm is out of co
it
traded with. Domestically, sellers’ liability would apply. 
 
If emission permits are also traded across borders, the situation is more complicated. If a firm
in Country A buys permits from a firm in Country B, and
c
anything in between). If the regulator in Country B appropriately enforces its emissions 
trading, the regulator in Country A may well accept the trade as valid. (This is still sellers
liability.) If the regulator in Country B turns a blind eye to firms exporting permits, the 
regulator in Country A may decline the imported permits, and treat the importers as if the
out of compliance. This is buyers’ liability. The importing firms may of course decide to see
compensation from the exporting firms, if the legal framework would allow them to. 
Ultimately, firms must justify their emissions to the domestic regulator, so that buyers’ 
liability applies to permits acquired from abroad. 
 
 
19 At COP-7 in Marrakech in November 2001 a compliance penalty including suspension of eligibility to use the 
flexibility mechanism and a deduction of any first-period shortfall from the allocation for the second 
commitment period was agreed; UNFCCC (2001). However, the legal text on compliance was delayed after the 
Protocol has entered into force.   
20 A survey of proposals is presented in Baron (1999) and Nordhaus et al. (2000). 
  13In Sections 2 and 3, we assume that every company complies with the regulations, and t
trades are valid. We also assume that companies re
hat all 
port to their regulator, comparing their 






buyers’ liability, buyers would screen sellers before trading.
21 A “carbon rating” would 
emerge, distinguishing trustworthy sellers from less reliable ones, just like credit ratings 
distinguish reliable borrowers. The carbon rating could be reflected in the price buyers are 
willing to pay. If companies abroad are systematically less reliable than compatriots, this
would drive a price wedge between the countries, just like a tariff does (see 7), but now o
course without the benefits of revenue collection. Alternative, potential non-compliance cou
be reflected in the quantity purchased. Let us again assume that there are systematic 
differences between the countries.
22 Let p denote the probability of the seller not complying
Therefore, with a p greater than zero the demand for unreliable permits would fall.  
 
Under buyers’ liability the problem looks like: 
(9)   
22 min +  s.t.  1 ;min  s.t.            AA A A A BB B B CR P R p P TCR P R P
A B RR   B T
with 0 ≤  p ≤ 1.
23 In fact, the carbon exchange rate d has the same effect as the “carbon rating” 
(1-p), if Country B’s companies have a lower standing in the carbon rating. Table I shows the 
ow prices of both countries. 
ly, that this imposes costs, the supply of emission permits 




                                                
shad
 
Under sellers’ liability, the consequence for a buyer being out of compliance would be borne 
by the seller. Assuming, as is like
w
domestic ones, a wedge between the domestic markets would again emerge. If this is reflected
in the price, the result is similar to introducing a tariff (but, again, without the revenues). 
Alternatively, permit sellers could play safe, and plan to overcomply. Let  denote for the ri
of non-compliance by the seller set by the selling country. 
 
The problem then looks like: 
(10) 
22 min +  s.t.  ;min      AA A A A BB B CR P R P TCR s.t.  (1 )     
A B
B RR P R P  
 
21 Companies may be fined if out of compliance. If not, companies presumably would need to buy additional 
permits, loosing the money paid for the invalid permits. 
22 If companies would doubt all purchased permits, they would overcomply in general, which should be modeled 
as an increase in the emissions targets TA and TB. 
23 The first-order conditions and solution are given in the appendix. 
  14with .
24 Total emissions fall by µP. Table I shows the shadow prices of both countries, 
e ratio of the two. That ratio is (1+Sellers’ liability, like buyers’ liability, di tates 
the ratio of e shadow prices; this ra is only by coincidence equal to the ratio of the 
marginal benefits of emission control. 
 
In the following two sections, we use numerical simulations to first compare both liability 
principles and then include the regulatory instruments into the analysis. The equations for the 
relation of costs from discount, tariff and quota under sellers’ or buyers’ liability are taken 
from Table I. 
 
5.1 Comparison of buyers’ and sellers’ liability 
Figure 5 compares the gains of trade under sellers’ and buyers’ liability to a situation of free 
trade.
25 Country A always prefers sellers’ liability, which is obvious. Country B prefers 
buyers’ liability if its target is loose, and sellers’ liability if its target is stricter. The reason 
that Country B prefers to be liable itself is as follows. Sellers’ liability is more expensive to B 
at the margin (see below). However, buyers’ liability constrains the market much more than 
does sellers’ liability (see below), and this is more costly to Country B than are the costs of 
bearing liability. This is independent of parameter choice. For both countries, the differences 
between buyers’ and sellers’ liability are greater if the target (of B) is stricter, but this matters 
more to B than it does to A. Both countries are better off, if p or   are close to zero, that is, 
the risk of non-compliance is fairly low. However, if the target is stricter, and the market is 











                                                
and th c
 th tio 

 
24 The first-order conditions and solutions are given in the appendix. 
25 Free trade is the situation where the selling country fully complies (100%) with their emission reduction target 
and no risk of non-compliance occurs (p=µ).  
  15 
Figure 5. Relative gains of trade for Country A and Country B under sellers’ or buyers’ 
liability as a function of the tightness of the market; the target of Country A is always 200, 
B’s target varies. The gains of trade with liability as a percentage of the gains without lia









































wer marginal costs than in the case of no trade. As Country A has to bear the costs, the 
arginal costs under buyers’ liability are higher than under sellers’ liability. Country B would 
 
 
The effect on the marginal costs of Country A is not surprising. See Figure 6. Both sellers’ 
and buyers’ liability lead to higher marginal costs compared to the situation of free trade and 
lo
m













  16Figure 6. The shadow prices of Country A (left axis) and Country B (right axis) under sellers’ 
and buyers’ liability as a function of the chance of non-compliance. The point on the far left 
corresponds to the situation of free trade, and the far right point to the situation of no trade. 



































































As noted above, the market is far more responsive to buyers’ liability than it is to sellers’ 
liability. Under buyers’ liability, the market breaks down at  
(10)  0( 1) 1





Pp T T p  
 AA T
whereas, under sellers’ liability, at 
(11)  0( 1 ) 1








     AA BB
 
 
and, without compliance problems, at 
(12) 0    AA BB P TT  
Recall that αATA>αBTB, otherwise permits would flow from Country A to Country B. So, 
ompliance problems restrain the market (as one would expect), and this effect is more 
llers’ liability. The reason is that buyers’ 
ity constrains the short e d of the market (the buyer) while sellers’ liability constrains 
c
pronounced with buyers’ liability than with se
liabil n
  17the long end of the market (the seller). The same chance of non-compliance (p=-µ), therefore 
g 
ments of a 
iscount, a tariff or a quota.
26 The equations are straightforward combinations of the ones 




than does a discount if 
ere are no liability issues, and the same is true with liability issues, regardless of whether the 
r 
n 
                                                
has proportionally a larger effect on the buyers’ side than on the sellers’ side. 
 
5.2 Compliance, liability and environmental integrity 
So far, we assumed that country A does not regulate trade, for example to avoid contradictin
their more ambitious target with relatively cheap emission permits from B. Below, we 
examine the relation between buyers’ and sellers’ liability and the policy instru
d
above. The optimization problems are given in the append
conditions and the solutions. Table I summarizes some of the results. 
 
Combining sellers’ liability or buyers’ liability with a carbon discount, a tariff or an impor
quota has the expected effect on the shadow prices of both countries. For example, liability
regulation increases the shadow price of Country A, and liability plus regulation increases the
shadow price more. A discount rate increases A’s shadow price faster 
th
buyers or the sellers of permits are liable for non-compliance. And so on. The same is true fo
the total costs. As shown above, both liability and regulation reduce the size of the market, 
and restrain the range of parameters for which there is any trade. The same is true for liability 
plus regulation. Figure 7 displays the discount and the tariff at which the market breaks down 
(P=0) as a function of the uncertainties underlying buyers’ and sellers’ liability. Liability 
constrains the room for regulation; the greater the uncertainty about traded permits, the less 
room there is to regulate the market with a tariff or discount. As before, the trade-off betwee
tariff and discount is d=1/t, regardless of whether buyers or sellers are liable. Also, buyers’ 
liability constrains the market more than does sellers’ liability, regardless of whether the 









26 The first-order conditions and the solutions are given in the appendix. 
  18Figure 7. The minimum discount (the d for which P=0) and the maximum tariff (the t for 
which P=0) as a function of the uncertainty (p and µ, respectively) underlying buyers’ liability 
and sellers’ liability. The target of Country A is 200; B’s target is 50; αA=2; αB=1. 
 
 

















































domestic, that is,  → ∞ in (A15) and (A24). 
his paper considers domestic markets of tradable permits for greenhouse gas emission 
ontrol, particularly the question under what conditions domestic markets would and should 
ss 
vironmental effectiveness, but there is a 




 policy.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
T
c
merge to become an international market. We focus on the case of two countries. It seems le
likely to achieve both cost effectiveness and en
p
 
We show that international trade benefits both countries. This is hardly surprising, as all 
has this effect. We also show that the international trade is environmental neutral, that is, tota
emissions stay the same. This is the case with all tradable permit systems. However, we argue 
that there might be pressure in the importing country to strengthen its emission reduction
policy, while in the exporting country might be an incentive to weaken its
 
  19The importing country can regulate the market with price (a “carbon tariff”) and quantity (a 
“carbon discount” or “import quota”) instruments. This can be done to smoothen regulatory 
differences between the countries (e.g., monitoring and enforcement), but also to encourage 
the selling country to accept a stricter target they intended or to deter the exporting country
from issuing additional permits for export only; if the latter is the goal, the importin
 
g country 
hould seek to keep the amount of imported permits constant, rather than the total emissions. 




ir targets and other regulations fixed, the market would solve that. 








An import quota would stress the idea of supplementary of international emission permit 
trading as it increases the share of emissions reduced domestically. Furthermore, it might be 
easier to implement than e.g. a tariff, as there are continuous debates on imposing tariffs for 
whatever reasons. 
 
Regulation constrains the market, and makes both countries in most cases worse off. 
Structural differences in the reliability of domestic and foreign permits, and structural 
differences in settling non-compliance claims in the home country and abroad would also 
constrain the market, but less so for sellers’ liability than for buyers’ liability. Both the 
importing and the e
n
 
The analysis presented here needs extension in at least three directions. Firstly, more 
countries need to be considered. So far, the analysis was limited to the case of two countrie
only. A lot of the results carry over to the case with more than two countries, although th
analysis becomes considerably more complex. The real complication lies in arbitrage. If 
countries keep the
H
marginal emission reduction costs or to prevent too much import from certain other co
– they would have to reckon with fairly complex feedback on their action. Arguably, the more
countries there are in the market, the less control each country has over its emission reducti
policy. Secondly, the choice of domestic emission standards should be made explicit. Thi
the domestic market of emission permits needs to be modeled. Fourthly, the analysis s
be extended to multiple greenhouse gases. This is straightforward if both countries use th
same exchange rates between gases, but introduces additional friction if not. These tasks are 
deferred to future research.  
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  21APPENDIX 
The problem of the binational market with a carbon discount rate is: 
(A1)   
22 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.        
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR P R d P TCR P R P   B T
with 0≤  d ≤ 1. 
 
The first order conditions of (6) are: 
(A2a)    2 0   AA A R
(A2b)    0 Ad  
(A2c)    0 AA Rd P T 
(A2d)    2 0   BB B R
(A2e)    0    B
(A2f)    0 BB RP T  
Total emissions fall by (1-d)P. 
 



































































If d=1, (A3) returns to (4). 
 
 
With an import quota, the problem looks like: 
(A4)   
2 2 min +  s.t.   and  ;min  s.t. 
A B
AA A A A A BB B B R R CR P R P TR P CR P R P         B T  
with  > 0. 
 
  22The first order conditions are: 
(A5a)    2 0 AA A C R   
(A5b)    0 AC     
(A5c)    0 AA RP T  
(A5d)    0 A RP  
(A5e)    2 0   BB B R
(A5f)    0    B
(A5g)    0 BB RP T  
Total emissions stay the same. 
 

































































With a tariff, the problem looks as follows: 
(A7)   
22 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.       
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR t P R P TCR P R P   B T
with t ≥ 1. 
 
The first order conditions of (A4) are: 
(A8a)    2 0   AA A R
(A8b)    0 A t 
(A8c)    0 AA RP T  
  23(A8d)    2 0   BB B R
(A8e)    0    B
(A8f)    0 BB RP T  
Total emissions stay the same.  
 





























































If t=1, (A9) returns to (4). 
 
With sellers’ liability, the problem looks like: 
(A10)   
22 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.  (1 )          
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR P R P TCR P R P  B T
with . 
 
The first order conditions are: 
(A11a) 2   0   AA A R
(A11b)     0 A 
(A11c)  RP   0 AA T  
(A11d) 2   0   BB B R
(A11e)     (1 ) 0     B
(A11f)    (1 ) 0 BB RP T    
Total emissions fall by µP.  
 
 
  24This solves as: 
(A12a)  22
(1 )














2( 1 ) 2( 1 )





   




B   
(A12c)  22
2( 1 ) 2














(1 ) (1 )
























If µ=0, (A12) returns to (4). 
 
Under buyers’ liability and an import quota, the problem looks like: 
(A13)
 
2 2 min +  s.t.  (1 )  and  ;min  s.t. 
A B
AA A A A A BB B B R R CR P R p P TR P CR P R P          B T  
with 0≤  p ≤ 1 and  > 0. 
 
The first order conditions are: 
(A14a) 2   0 AA A C R   
(A14b)     (1 ) 0 AC p    
(A14c)  Rp   (1 ) 0 AA P T   
(A14d)  R   0 A P  
(A14e) 2   0   BB B R
(A14f)    0    B
(A14g)  RP   0 BB T  
Total emissions stay the same.  
 



































B    
(A15d) 2
2( 1) 2 2






























if p = 0, (A15) returns to (A6).   
 
 
Under buyers’ liability and a tariff, the problem is: 
(A16)   
2 2 min +  s.t.  1 ;min  s.t. 
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR t P R p P TCR P R P         B T    
with 0≤  p ≤ 1 and t >1. 
 
The first order conditions of are: 
(A17a)     2 0   AA A R
(A17b)     (1 ) 0 A tp   
(A17c)     (1 ) 0 AA Rp P T   
(A17d)     2 0 BB B R  
(A17e)     0 B   
(A17f)     0 BB RP T  
Total emissions fall by pP.  
 
This solves as: 
(A18a)  22
(1 )

















2( 1 ) 2( 1 )






























  26(A18d)  22
(1 )


















(1 ) (1 )














If t=1, (A18) returns to (A3), with (1-p)=d. If p=0, (A18) returns to (A9). If t=1 and p=0, 
(A18) returns to (4). 
 
 
Under seller’s liability in combination with a discount, the problem looks like: 
(A19)   
2 2 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.  (1 )
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR P R d P TCR P R P          
with >0and 0≤ d ≤1. 
 
The first order conditions are: 
(A20a)     2 0   AA A R
(A20b)     0 Ad 
(A20c)    0 AA Rd P T 
(A20d)     2 0 BB B R  
(A20e)     (1 ) 0 B     
(A20f)     (1 ) 0 BB RP T    
Total emissions fall by (1+µ-d)P. 
 
This solves as: 
(A21a)  22 2
(1 )
















2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
















2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
















2( 1 ) 2
















(1 ) (1 )






























If µ=0, (A21) returns to (A3). If d=0, (A21) returns to (A12). If  µ=d=0, (A21) returns to (4). 
 
 
Under seller’s liability in combination with an import quota, the problem looks like: 
(A22)
 
2 2 min +  s.t.   and  ;min  s.t.  (1 )
A B
AA A A A A BB B B R R CR P R P TR P CR P R P             B T 
with >0 and  > 0. 
 
The first order conditions are: 
(A23a) 2   0 AA A C R   
(A23b)     0 AC    
(A23c)  RP   0 AA T  
(A23d)  R   0 A P  
(A23e) 2   0   BB B R
(A23f)    (1 ) 0 B    
(A23g)  RP   (1 ) 0 BB T    
 





































































  28(A24g) 
1
1







If = 0, (A24) returns to (A6).    
 
 
Under seller’s liability in combination with a tariff, the problem looks like: 
(A25)   
2 2 min +  s.t.  ;min  s.t.  (1 )
A B
AA A A A BB B B RR CR t P R P TCR P R P           B T 
with >0 and t 1. 
 
The first order conditions are: 
(A26a)    2 0   AA A R
(A26b)     0 A t 
(A26c)     0 AA RP T  
(A26d)     20 BB B R  
(A26e)     (1 ) 0 B     
(A26f)     (1 ) 0 BB RP T    
 
Total emissions fall by µP. This solves as: 
(A27a)  22
(1 )
















2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)






   








2( 1 ) 2( 1 )







   




B   
(A27d)  22
2( 1 ) 2















(1 ) (1 )



























If µ=0, (A27) returns to (A9). If t=1, (A27) returns to (A12). If µ=0 and t=1, (A27) returns to 
(4). 
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  31Table I. The shadow prices of both countries without trade, with free trade, and with 11 forms of restricted trade. 
  Shadow price, Country A  Shadow price, Country B  Ratio of the shadow prices 
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